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THE INTERLEGALITY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 
ROBERT WAI* 
I 
PRIVATE LAW AND THE PLURAL  
NORMATIVE ORDERS OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
This article describes transnational private law as a decentralized and 
intermediate form of transnational governance that recognizes and manages the 
multiplicity of norms generated by plural normative systems in our 
contemporary world society. These include international and municipal state 
systems, nonstate social systems, and private ordering by parties. Consistent 
with an approach that views globalization as changing the nature of the 
sovereignty of states,1 the article draws on the rich tradition of private law, 
considered with its international dimensions, to find both a concrete example of 
and a model for understanding the complex role of the state in the plural 
normative orders of the “postnational constellation.”2 In this task, this article 
views private law understood in its international context as exemplary of an 
intermediate level of transnational governance.3 
With a focus on the plural normative orders of international business 
transactions, the article discusses how transnational private law4 addresses the 
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 1. See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
(1996) (describing challenges posed by globalization for fundamental principles of the modern state). 
 2. See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION (2001). 
 3. Transnational governance is defined as including “various and untraditional types of 
international and regional collaboration among both public and private actors.” TRANSNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM ix (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). The task of linking 
private international law with transnational governance is here identified with Christian Joerges; his 
work is acknowledged and discussed in Robert Wai, Conflicts and Comity in Transnational Governance: 
Private International Law as Mechanism and Metaphor for the Relationship Among the Plural Orders of 
Transnational Social Regulation, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, MULTILEVEL TRADE GOVERNANCE AND 
SOCIAL REGULATION 229, 247–51 (Christian Joerges & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2006). 
 4. In this article, transnational private law is understood primarily as the combination of domestic 
private laws and private international law. Transnational law is often more expansively defined to 
include a broad range of norms including, for example, public international law, national public laws, 
and the rules of nonstate organizations like corporations. See, e.g., Philip C. Jessup, TRANSNATIONAL 
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limits of theoretical understandings of global business norms informed by global 
legal pluralism. Not only is transnational private law one important normative 
regime of international business, but it is also identified as providing a good 
analytical model for understanding the interrelationship among plural norms. In 
contrast to leading accounts of global business relations, this article’s account of 
transnational private law emphasizes the plural character of each of the 
multiple legal regimes of international business, whether state law or nonstate 
law. Connected with that plural character of state and nonstate normative 
orders, this model describes a view of the normative interrelationship not 
simply as a place of harmonization, but also as a place of productive normative 
contestation. 
Transnational private law is used as a frame to consider private 
international law together with private law.5 An appreciation of private law as 
concerned with the relationship among plural and transnational normative 
orders is obscured because subjects of private law and private international law 
are typically considered separately.6 When viewed together, a sense of the long-
established task for private law of relating normative orders that challenge state 
boundaries becomes clearer. 
Viewing transnational private law in this way, the connection among private 
law, global legal pluralism, and transnational governance of business relations is 
made clearer. The concept of transnational governance posits that, in our 
“partially globalized world,”7 a multiplicity of often overlapping forms of cross-
border and subnational governance, including state and nonstate forms, creates 
governance beyond traditional state models but short of world government. 
Transnational private law plays a significant role in global business, whether 
through the facilitation of international business transactions or through the 
regulation of such transactions by transnational private litigation or by 
regulatory standards included as terms of private international contracts. This 
 
LAW 1–16 (1956). Such a concept of transnational law is too broad for the focus of this article on the 
role of private laws; for further discussion, see Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private 
Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471, 471–72 (2005). 
 5. In this article, private law means state laws such as contract law, tort law, and property law. 
Private international law means state laws related to issues of jurisdiction, choice of law, and 
recognition of enforcement of judgments, in private-law disputes with connections to more than one 
legal jurisdiction. This article is premised on the value of viewing these two kinds of law together, as 
further discussed infra IV. 
 6. In North America, private-law subjects are treated as core first-year law-school topics; private 
international law is almost inevitably an upper-year, elective course. Courses in the law of international 
business transactions are intended to cover the range of different kinds of relevant laws, including some 
reference to both private law and private international law. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS : A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK (Ralph H. Folsom et al. eds., 7th ed. 2004). In 
treating so many topics, the risk is that a refined sense of the private-international-law regime (or any 
other single regime) is lost, even in the most sophisticated socio-legal accounts; for example, there is 
little discussion of private international law in the excellent volume by JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER 
DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION (2000). Equally important, the interrelationship among 
these multiple kinds of global business norms is often poorly articulated. 
 7. ROBERT KEOHANE, POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 
(2002). 
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function for transnational private law endures because most global economic 
activity remains embedded in configurations of state laws and institutions.8 In 
this sense, both state and nonstate normative orders related to international 
business remain plural regimes; there is no complete separation of either the 
state or the nonstate orders. If that is the case, the regulatory function of private 
law in a global era includes the subtle task of coordinating both state and 
nonstate normative orders. By foregrounding the centrality of both state and 
nonstate norms, private law provides a useful corrective to a tendency in 
doctrinal-law scholarship to focus on state norms, and the tendency in leading 
works of global legal pluralism to emphasize nonstate normative orders. 
Finally, in addition to its role as an important governance regime of world 
society, transnational private law provides a model for understanding the 
interaction among state and nonstate normative systems more generally in a 
world of global legal pluralism. A focus on transnational private law recognizes 
the plural nature of governing norms, and then addresses the interrelationship 
among those plural systems of norms. In this respect, transnational private law 
exemplifies the concept of interlegality described by Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos as the “different legal spaces superimposed, interpenetrated and mixed 
in our minds, as much as in our actions, either on occasions of qualitative leaps 
or sweeping crises in our life trajectories, or in the dull routine of eventless 
everyday life.”9 
This article advances a distinct view of interlegality, emphasizing that with 
plural orders one should expect an interrelationship of normative contestation 
as much as an interrelationship of harmonization or unification. Transnational 
private law as transnational governance highlights that some degree of 
contestation and conflict is the legitimate function of law as a place for 
disputation. The legitimacy of private law indeed comes importantly from that 
role: law, including private law, is not only about the efficient facilitation of 
transactions. It also is related to how individual actors in our global society can 
disagree about the right thing to be done in a particular transaction and to seek 
financial compensation and deterrence, for example, to stop a polluting plant or 
bad work practices. In addition, through the public functions of state processes, 
private-law disputes can publicize contestable behavior in the broader society. 
This communication can also involve contestation at a more general ideational 
level of policies advanced by business or by state, or efforts to reframe public 
debate about the relative priority among goals such as regulation, distribution, 
and efficiency.10 
 
 8. This embeddedness is clearly uneven in terms of its locational distribution. See, e.g., Saskia 
Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 91 (Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas Biersteker eds., 2002). 
 9. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 437 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 10. The ideational function of private law is discussed further in Wai, supra note 4, at 481–84. 
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II 
BUSINESS NORMS IN AN ERA OF GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 
Global legal pluralism offers an excellent conceptual frame for 
understanding normative contestation across and among the different state and 
nonstate normative orders of contemporary global society. Striking analyses 
have been provided that highlight the challenge associated with the growth of 
multiple normative orders in the current global society. For instance, the 
account of interlegality quoted above comes from Santos’s pathbreaking work 
on global legal pluralism. 
However, leading accounts of global pluralism have so far not provided the 
tools to fully capture the nature of the interrelationship among these different 
orders. Two leading accounts of global legal pluralism in the business context by 
Santos and Gunther Teubner illustrate the challenge in modeling the 
relationship of this complex normative terrain. Whereas both provide brilliant 
descriptions of the existence of plural orders, and both recognize issues of 
interlegality,11 both fail to provide a full account of the interpenetration, 
overlap, and linkage among different normative orders in the business context. 
More careful attention to the role of private law, particularly in connection with 
private international law, offers a corrective to these accounts and may signal a 
way forward in understanding the coexistence of, and complex normative 
relationship among, the multiple state and nonstate orders of global legal 
pluralism. 
A. Business Norms in Postmodern Global Society 
The normative framework for contemporary business transactions is clearly 
varied, including state laws, public international law, private international law, 
and various normative orders associated primarily with nonstate institutions or 
private ordering. The observation that the terrain of global business law is 
plural is consistent with traditional approaches both to the field of the law of 
international business transactions and to leading socio-legal analyses of global 
business.12 However, it has proved difficult to model how the normative aspects 
of such a plural terrain for global business fit together. Global legal pluralism 
would seem to offer a good theory for this task.13 
The early and leading work on globalization of law by Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos illustrates the broad challenge for constructing a new legal common 
 
 11. An earlier version of the passage from Santos concerning interlegality is cited with approval in 
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM 107 (1993). 
 12. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 6. 
 13. For an informative use of legal pluralism in the analysis of issues of jurisdiction and 
globalization, see Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (2005); 
see also Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the 
Challenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209 (2005) (discussing pluralism and 
private international law). In contrast with the Berman and Michaels articles, the focus of this article is 
more on how a consideration of legal pluralism can illuminate issues of interlegality among plural 
orders, especially when combined with an examination of underlying state private law. 
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sense in a world society that has seen the growth of multiple normative orders 
associated with globalization. Santos argues that global legal scholarship should 
shift attention from “the somewhat sterile debate about relative weight of 
transnational and national factors to a more promising one on the increasing 
internal heterogeneization of state regulation.”14 Santos identifies an expansive 
and diverse array of contemporary emergent legal fields including European 
law, lex mercatoria, migration, human rights, and jus humanitatis. In his 
influential conceptualization, Santos classifies forms of globalization as 
hegemonic globalization from above—in the forms of globalizing localisms and 
localizing globalisms—and counter-hegemonic globalization from below, 
including subaltern cosmopolitanism and the common heritage of mankind.15 
He advocates for the development of a cosmopolitan legality arising out of the 
counter-hegemonic forces, represented, for example, in social movements such 
as human-rights networks.16 
Santos is clear that this is a theoretical conceptualization and that in practice 
the forms of globalization are more cross-cutting and intertwined.17 However, a 
weakness in this conceptualization is that his survey of plural orders tends to 
result in flattened, simplified accounts of each particular order and in an 
unfortunate segregation of the analysis of the different kinds of orders. This is 
especially evident in his discussion of global business law, with its focus on lex 
mercatoria.18 
Santos is caught up with the idea of lex mercatoria as “global capital’s own 
law,”19 evidencing a globalized localism of laws helpful to the capital interests of 
the North. In his account, lex mercatoria arises from the needs and practices of 
transnational commercial and corporate actors and their supporting institutions 
to create a “deterritorialized set of normative principles and rules,” including 
norms aimed at “circumventing submission to national laws and to the 
traditional conflict of laws.”20 The lex mercatoria is sustained by a global legal 
culture exemplified by global (especially U.S. corporate) law firms and 
international commercial arbitration.21 In his analysis, it is nonstate lex 
mercatoria that is as likely to drive state law as vice-versa, as in the protection of 
private-property interests through state laws.22 
In emphasizing the singularity of the lex mercatoria, especially as a force of 
hegemonic globalization, Santos fails to situate it within the broad array of state 
public and private laws that regulate business law, such as competition policy or 
tort law. Santos mentions the role of private law only in passing, through a 
 
 14. SANTOS, supra note 9, at 199. 
 15. Id. at 179–82. 
 16. Id. at 180–82, 458–93. 
 17. Id. at 166. 
 18. Id. at 206–15. 
 19. SANTOS, supra note 9, at 208. 
 20. Id. at 209–10. 
 21. Id. at 212–14. 
 22. Id. at 211–12. 
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reference to private international law as a competing system developed by 
states to deal with growth of earlier lex mercatoria.23 Contrary to his concept of 
interlegality, Santos does not consider the degree to which many nonstate 
norms are reflected in or reflect state-law norms, nor does he attend to the 
complexity of the heterogeneous nature of merchant practice itself.24 Nor does 
he note that relevant business contracts, including standard form contracts, 
refer to state-law norms as well as to nonstate norms.25 
The resulting account of the lex mercatoria is unfamiliar to any business 
actor or business lawyer operating in the current international sphere. Santos 
notes the suspicion of common-law lawyers with respect to accounts of lex 
mercatoria, which he thinks odd given the reputation of the common law for 
attending to legal practice.26 But it is as plausible to argue that attention to 
actual practice explains the skepticism of common lawyers toward expansive 
claims for the lex mercatoria.27 
Santos moves on, however, to elaborate a variety of other forms of global 
legal fields, including the human-rights regime, migration law, and common-
heritage regimes. But, again, the problem is that these are set up as 
countervailing, separate normative orders, rather than interpenetrating orders. 
This reduces the utility of the analysis for a field such as the law of international 
business transactions. 
B. Systems Theory and Global Merchant Law Without the State 
Systems theory seems ideal for better understanding the normative 
functions of transnational private law because it focuses on the plural nature of 
normative orders in contemporary society and because it views social systems as 
centrally about communications.28 Its focus on the internal self-understanding of 
social systems is a welcome advance for rigorously analyzing the normative 
character of nonstate social systems and for identifying connections and 
conflicts among different normative orders. However, systems accounts 
ultimately emphasize the closed, autopoietic nature of social systems, which 
rejects an internal perspective on normative orders that is itself a pluralist one. 
 
 23. Id. at 209. 
 24. To recognize the role of private law, one need not argue against some concept of hegemonic 
globalization. Santos could plausibly have used his own frame of global localisms to trace the projection 
of private-law values from influential state systems like New York or the United Kingdom, rather than 
an amorphous set of nonstate lex mercatoria. Such a global localism could be a tool of competing state 
interests or of private interests. 
 25. See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 447 (2007). 
 26. SANTOS, supra note 9, at 213. 
 27. A similar response to the skepticism toward lex mercatoria among actual practitioners is found 
in a leading volume on the subject, KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE 
LEX MERCATORIA 5–6 (1999). 
 28. See generally NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL SYSTEMS (John Bedmarz & Dirk Baecker trans., 
1995). 
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Consistent with pluralism, systems theorists observe the growth of various 
kinds of nonstate-based social systems in modern society. A starting premise of 
systems analysis based on “second-order” observation is that social practices, 
rather than an abstract or ideal theory of law, determine the boundaries of 
normative systems. Thus, the boundaries of social systems are based on the 
criteria used by the social system itself. This kind of openness to the normative 
content of social systems, therefore, includes an opening to social systems 
broader than state legal regimes. 
In contemporary global society, Gunther Teubner argues that the normative 
orders associated with each of these emergent functional systems—of 
international business practice, of multinational corporations, of human-rights 
communities, of ecological networks—are as significant as nation-state legal 
regimes.29 These systems generate, through a process of autopoiesis, closed 
communicative codes of legality and thereby challenge any conception of global 
law premised on primacy of existing state orders. More recently, Fischer-
Lescano and Teubner argue that this fragmentation of global society also limits 
any efforts in public international law to find unity and harmonization based on 
traditional state-law forms.30 Such a view of the primacy of nonstate orders in 
global society resonates with analyses from a political-economy perspective that 
identify the dramatic rise of private authority in the transnational business 
area.31 
In his provocative 1997 argument, Teubner observes that global functional 
differentiation is occurring such that state legal systems are being replaced by 
autopoietic social systems, “global law without a state,” which use (a) a binary 
code of legal–illegal and (b) reproduction by a symbol of global (not national) 
validity.32 The primary example that Teubner references is the lex mercatoria 
founded on a basis of a self-validating (and paradoxical) contract. From the 
founding contract, as stabilized through increasingly elaborate structures of 
hierarchy, temporalization, and externalization,33 the lex mercatoria produces 
the operative closure required for an autopoietic system, even if the system 
remains vulnerable to the economic exigencies of its coupled economic regime, 
is episodic in character, and relies much on “soft law.” Teubner does not 
emphasize the connection between perceptions in the system of the validity of 
the contract and the potential enforcement of the contract in any state system; 
rather, he emphasizes that the system simply accepts the contract as its 
foundation and resolves the “paradox of a self-validating contract” through the 
 
 29. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW 
WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). 
 30. Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal 
Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1007–08 (2003–2004). 
 31. See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY (2003). 
 32. Teubner, supra note 29, at 17. 
 33. Id. at 15–17. 
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articulation of merchant norms, lex mercatoria, and private dispute resolution, 
most obviously commercial arbitration.34 
The 1997 argument demonstrates in a concentrated way the tendency in 
social-systems analysis to push sociological foundations to extremes of 
characterization. Teubner starts with the reasonable observation that there may 
be multiple kinds of law at work: what he refers to as political, legal, and social 
law production. But his understanding of fragmented globalization gives 
“different relative weights” to different norm productions.35 In particular, global 
economic law is understood as a “highly asymmetric process of legal self-
reproduction.”36 He notes that one can identify numerous phenomena that, “in 
accordance with traditional positivist theories—have a clearly national and 
international basis,” such as national commercial codes or the UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.37 But his account nonetheless 
proceeds to excessively focus on the singularity of the nonstate side of the 
business regulatory order. He refers to the “lex mercatoria propria.”38 Through 
this term, which is not commonly used even in the specialized lex mercatoria 
literature, Teubner purges the practice of any impure elements. Even the 
shadow of state law disappears from a role in this system. 
Respecting both the dispute-settlement procedure of arbitration and the 
substantive governing law of lex mercatoria, Teubner’s account of the role of 
the state is purified to include the single emphasis on the self-validating 
contract, in which in turn there apparently is no reference to (or expectation of) 
state process, state law, or even bargaining in the shadow of state law.39 
Contract, whether deferred to by state law or, after some point, automatically 
understood as constitutive in its own right by parties, becomes both the moment 
of connection to established state law and its moment of separation. This is a 
memorable moment, but one that is also fraught. Most obviously, this account 
fails to explain the role of either public regulation or private law, such as tort 
law, in protecting and intruding interests of third parties from the effects of 
these consensual relations. Even as between contractual parties, as elaborated 
below, state law and process remains present in constituting the private 
ordering between contractual parties. With respect to contractual dispute 
settlement, the analysis obscures the role of state law in sustaining the 
procedures of arbitration. 
This partial account mutates what the actual law merchant, in the sense of 
norms followed by business actors and their advisors, is about. “Second-order 
observation” is supposed to allow legal practices—rather than, for example, an 
 
 34. Id. at 15–19. 
 35. Id. at 11. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Teubner, supra note 29, at 12. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (discussing the role of law in providing a framework for divorce 
negotiations and settlements outside of the courtroom). 
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abstracted, pure legal theory—to decide the boundaries of law. Most observers 
would see that transnational business actors do not engage in the use of a purely 
a-national lex mercatoria propria—whether customary norms or contractual 
norms—in isolation from the state system.40 Teubner notes the vehement 
rejection of theories of lex mercatoria by “mainly British and American 
lawyers” who seem rather attached to the importance in practice of 
sovereignty.41 He dismisses this skepticism as reflecting a kind of false 
consciousness related to “a legal world still conceptually dominated by the 
nation-state.”42 But if the actual practitioners disbelieve the account of a pure 
nonstate lex mercatoria, should not second-order observation attend? 
III 
THE COMPLEX NORMATIVE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
A. Plural Normative Expectations in International Business 
The skepticism of legal practitioners concerning lex mercatoria, let alone a 
lex mercatoria propria, suggests that there has been no autopoietic separation of 
normative expectations of transnational business actors of the kind imagined by 
systems theory. Clearly, significant norms are generated in nonstate sources, 
whether through contracts, particular trades, or more institutionalized nonstate 
venues such as the International Chamber of Commerce.43 But business actors 
continue to expect a blend of state and nonstate norms, and state and nonstate 
processes, including for dispute settlement. 
This state of normative expectations aligns with accounts of complex 
“affective relationships” in an era of multiculturalism and globalization.44 Norms 
correlate to underlying material conditions involving substantial overlap among 
different social networks. The overlaps are various. There is significant 
sociological and normative overlap between state and nonstate systems. There 
also remains significant overlap in both membership and subject matter among 
different functional systems such as business and labor networks. In addition, 
functional systems may be cross-cut by nonstate-based ethnicities and 
 
 40. Even leading advocates of lex mercatoria rely on state sources to bolster the plausibility of its 
reality and its relevance; for example, see the discussion of the “creeping codification” concept in 
BERGER, supra note 27. 
 41. Teubner, supra note 29, at 10. 
 42. Id.  
 43. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, Official Rules for the Interpretation of Trade 
Terms, ICC Publication No. 560 (2000) [hereinafter ICC, Incoterms]; International Chamber of 
Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, ICC Publication No. 600 (2007) 
[hereinafter ICC, UCP]. 
 44. Roderick A. Macdonald, Access to Justice in Canada Today: Scope, Sale and Ambitions, in 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE WAY FORWARD 19 (Julia Bass et al. eds., 2005). 
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nationalities, such as transnational Chinese or Jewish business networks, further 
complicating the blend of norms in play.45 
In countering an excessive focus on state law, pluralist accounts of global 
business should not ascribe to nonstate norms a fixed facticity that denies either 
the reality of concurrent normative systems or the contested and open-textured 
nature of any particular normative system.46 This is a constant risk that pluralist 
work in anthropology has addressed.47 Such an account of plural and contested 
norms also seems necessary to reflect sophisticated contemporary accounts of 
identity and culture, in which national, ethnic, and professional identities 
matter, but are plural, complex, dynamic, and the subject of critical struggle.48 
B. Interlegality and Normative Contestation 
In the contemporary global order, participants in any particular order are 
more likely to be aware of the multiplicity of potentially competing normative 
systems, and, if so, it can be said that in a plural transnational society, normative 
systems operate in the shadow of each other.49 If this is the state of normative 
expectations, a better model of global legal pluralism is captured in the idea of 
interlegality identified by Santos, although not applied by him in his discussion 
of global business norms. 
When there is awareness of multiple normative systems, there is also greater 
sense among participants of the possibility of overlap and conflict, and thereby 
a recognition of the contested nature of any single normative order. This in turn 
helps to reinforce the insights identified by critical legal theory that the 
normative code of any particular social system is rife with contradictions, gaps, 
and ambiguities.50 Similarly, the overlap in membership reinforces the possibility 
 
 45. See generally RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS 325–420 (Richard Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the role of Chinese guanxi 
networks in international business transactions); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: 
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140–42 (1992) 
(describing how diamond merchants opt out of the legal system by creating an alternative system based 
on ties that include homogenous-group-based extralegal contractual regimes among Jewish merchants); 
JANET LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994) (analyzing ethnic 
trading networks from the perspective of new institutional economics). 
 46. See Jeremy Webber, Legal Pluralism and Human Agency, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 167 (2006) 
(providing a conception of legal pluralism attentive to human disagreement). 
 47. See Sally Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 875–76 (1988). In the colonial 
context, anthropologists have demonstrated that the received or constructed account of local law and 
norms was simplified, including through the lens of western ideas about legal coherence. See generally, 
e.g., SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS & FABRICATIONS: “CUSTOMARY” LAW ON KILIMANJARO, 
1880–1980 (1986). 
 48. AFTER IDENTITY xviii–xix (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995); see also JAMES 
CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE (1988) (tracing the contested and hybrid nature of 
culture in the twentieth century). 
 49. See Merry, supra note 47, at 880–86; Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private 
Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 23–24 (1981). 
 50. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 94–95 (2000). 
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of collisions of functional rationalities and policy priorities that strain the 
credibility of the idea of a single shared code of legality or normativity.51 
Individual members become carriers of different mixes of norms from system to 
system, constantly testing dominant norms of each system by providing 
argumentative bite to latent or minority normative strands within each order. 
Moreover, awareness of interlegality and the plural nature of a society in any 
particular normative order—whether state law, custom, religion, or merchant 
practice—counters the tendency toward normative closure. 
Normative contestation should be viewed as an important function for 
transnational law, not simply a problem that is in need of resolution. This runs 
counter to strong tendencies in contemporary private law favoring decisional 
harmony and the efficient facilitation of commerce as the goal of international 
trade and business law.52 The norm of contestation is a deeply social 
commitment and a normal part of most societies.53 Room for such contestation 
is a means in many legal systems for achieving regulatory goals—for example, 
to correct for problems of externalities on third parties. But more broadly, 
contestation allows normative challenges to be made, reflecting tensions 
between different values of the normative order; such contestation can be an 
important foundation for a legitimate political order based on the competition 
and deliberation among different norms. 
Venues for contestation are especially important transnationally because of 
regulatory and governance gaps that exist in our global society.54 For example, 
transnational private litigation in state courts can provide an opportunity to 
seek retribution and compensation, to make arguments, to publicize bad 
conduct, and generally to contest behavior of private actors, such as 
multinational corporations that engage in cross-border conduct. This kind of 
contestation is needed to address governance gaps opened up in the 
international order where many problems are globalized but political and legal 
forms remain primarily situated in the nation-state, where national 
governments tend to be parochial in their regulatory focus, and where 
 
 51. See Gunther Teubner, Altera Pars Audiatur: Law in the Collision of Discourses, in LAW, 
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND 
POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895–1995 149, 152 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997) (identifying discourses of 
“politicisation, moralisation, scientification and economisation”). 
 52. In the field of private international law, see, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments as a Trade Law Issue: The Economics of Private International Law, in ECONOMIC 
DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 592 (Jagdeep S. Bahnadari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997); 
MICHAEL J. WHINCOP & MARY KEYES, POLICY AND PRAGMATISM IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(2001) (adopting an economic approach to conflict of laws). 
 53. See, e.g., LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROJECTS 117–67 
(2002) (contesting the ideology of the “harmony legal model”). Nader observes that in many societies 
“disputing may be a means to harmony and to autonomy and self-determination; and conflict may be 
part of the struggle in life that keeps people bound together.” Id. at 125. For two further examples 
taken from very different contexts, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE 
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) and ROBERT A. KAGAN, LAWSUITS AND LITIGANTS IN CASTILLE 
1500–1700 (1981). 
 54. See Wai, supra note 4, at 478–81. 
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international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization, are only 
weakly empowered to address the full range of cross-border problems that arise 
in a global society. Such contestation through private law can also be 
understood as serving a communicative function in advancing broader policy 
debates in the global context; for example, high-profile litigation cases 
concerning foreign business conduct related to environmental or human rights, 
such as in extraction industries in Sudan, Burma, or Ecuador, can help to raise 
general issues about corporate social responsibility in a global context.55 
Attention to a more open and complex account of transnational normative 
systems may also be a route toward social solidarity beyond the nation-state.56 
Systems-theory accounts of law are sometimes interpreted as examples of 
movement beyond old public–private distinctions of state law to a “transparent 
and democratic process of constant, free and open interaction among 
singularities, which through their communication produces common norms.”57 
However, as Jurgen Habermas notes, autopoietic accounts of social systems 
ultimately share the challenge of social theories comprised only of individual 
rational-choice actors, namely “[t]he total absence of any intersubjectively 
shared values, norms or processes of understanding.”58 The focus in this article 
is on the way in which plural normative orders are often internally plural and 
interlegal and are further linked by cross-cutting membership. Though perhaps 
falling short of a community of interest, one consequence of intertwined 
normative orders is the creation of possibilities for productive contestation 
within and across those orders. In such an account, conflict of norms is viewed 
less as a problem in need of resolution; contestation instead becomes a normal 
part of building the legitimate foundations for a global society. 
C. Normative Conflict in Plural Orders and the Role of the State 
Structurally, the nature of a dispute will push parties to find alternative 
argumentative veins in any normative tradition. Where there is overlapping 
membership, this tendency is reinforced as actors will constantly be looking to 
avoid normative closure and seek recourse outside of any single social system, 
including state laws. The same impulse will push parties toward “forum-
shopping” in the sense of both venue and substantive law.59 Forum-shopping, 
overlapping jurisdiction, and governing laws are of course familiar to conflict-
of-laws scholars and practitioners, although usually they are characterized as 
 
 55. See Craig Scott & Robert Wai, Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct Through the 
Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational Private Litigation, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004). 
 56. See COSMOPOLITICS: THINKING AND FEELING BEYOND THE NATION (Pheng Cheah & Bruce 
Robbins eds., 1998). 
 57. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF 
EMPIRE 204, n.125 (2004) (citing Teubner, among others). 
 58. HABERMAS, supra note 2, at 142. 
 59. See Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing 
in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 117 (1981). 
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problems to be solved. From a perspective committed to normative 
contestation, there may be reasons to view this consequence and use of 
pluralism as positive. In this respect, there are analogies to the turn to 
transnational venues and norms practiced by transnational advocacy networks 
and international-human-rights actors.60 
When there is self-conscious awareness of the plural nature of participants’ 
memberships, not only is movement among venues possible, but expectations 
develop respecting how the different normative systems operate together. 
These can include expectations respecting rules on how to choose among 
systems or expectations about venues for dispute resolution. In this context, the 
state returns to play a significant role. 
When disputes as to the mix between different normative systems exist, 
disputants expect state courts to play the role of arbiter of questions of 
jurisdiction and governing law. Of course, full adjudication in civil courts is the 
exception, not the norm, in business disputes.61 Robert Mnookin and Lewis 
Kornhauser have identified that bargaining and outcomes often occur in the 
“shadow of the law.”62 More generally, Marc Galanter has observed that the 
courts provide “a background of norms and procedures against which 
negotiations and regulation in both private and governmental settings takes 
place.”63 The notion of conduct in the shadow of the law has been foundational 
to broader study of alternative dispute resolution, but the insight is more 
generally made with respect to legal pluralism.64 
In performing this oversight function with respect to disputes, including in 
situations where social systems overlap, state legal institutions retain a core role 
in a partially globalized world. This oversight function, which may not be 
needed or used by parties in every dispute but which remains in the 
background, reflects that parties share a general ambivalence toward the state 
form, including in a global context. The state appears as “both remedy and 
poison” with respect to globalization.65 Populations still look to states to address 
problems generated by international markets, flows of people, and security 
threats, even as they see that the states are themselves the source of 
concentrated violence, inefficiency, corruption, and exclusion of nonresidents. 
 
 60. See MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization 
of International Human Rights Norms Into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 18–19 (Thomas Risse et al. 
eds., 1999) (developing the “spiral model” of interaction of international human-rights norms and 
domestic practices, including “boomerang patterns” comprised of efforts by transnational actors to 
bypass states and search out external or international sources to pressure states). 
 61. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61–62 (1963). 
 62. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 39. 
 63. Galanter, supra note 49, at 6. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Jacques Derrida, Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides, in PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF 
TERROR 85, 124 (Giovanna Borradori ed., 2003). 
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Santos and others imagine an alternative transnational politics that moves away 
from a fixation on the coercive power of the state and focuses on other diverse 
forms of politics that spring as much from practices of social contestation.66 
However, given the current state of expectations and practice in each of the 
different transnational areas of world society, state forms of sovereignty, for all 
their problems, often remain the most effective and legitimate forms of dispute 
settlement. Transnational governance will need to rely on the maintenance of 
roles for both state and nonstate systems in governance. 
IV 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW—VIEWING  
PRIVATE LAW AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW TOGETHER 
To demonstrate how state and nonstate levels interact in constituting the 
normative character of transnational governance, this section considers private 
law and private international law together under the rubric of transnational 
private law.67 Viewing the two fields together clarifies that private-law systems 
have already been very much involved in addressing both state and nonstate 
systems of normative ordering in a cross-border context. 
A. Private Law and Nonstate Norms 
It is impossible to articulate the regulatory function of private international 
law without a sense of the regulatory functions of the underlying private laws.68 
An awareness of underlying private law is also necessary to recognize private 
law’s important function of relating state to nonstate normative orders, 
including in a cross-border context. 
Private law has long wrestled with the existence of private ordering and 
multiple social orders. For example, Eugen Ehrlich viewed commercial law as 
exemplary of the living law, which “dominates life itself even though it has not 
been posited in legal propositions.”69 He notes of the commercial law that it was 
the one branch of law based “not merely incidentally, but throughout on actual 
usage.”70 The dynamism of commercial practice constantly pushes beyond the 
adjustments to commercial law made by legislator and judge. For example, 
 
 66. Alternative regimes premised on a noncoercive politics not based on the state are described, 
for example, in the political anthropology of PIERRE CLASTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE: 
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1974). 
 67. See Wai, supra note 4, at 471–72. A similar critique of conflict of laws and its relation to the 
substantive law has been made with a very different response of turning to lex mercatoria. See BERGER, 
supra note 27, at 10–17, 30. 
 68. See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of 
Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209, 232–38 (2002). 
 69. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 493 (Walter Moll 
trans., reissue 1962). 
 70. Id. 
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Ehrlich notes that, even at his time, the important source of commercial law is 
not the judicial decision, but rather the “modern business document.”71 
The transnational dimension of commercial-law development is often 
underappreciated. Commercial laws have borrowed extensively from private 
ordering, customs, and standards developed by merchants engaged in cross-
border trade, including in the sale of goods (for example, with respect to 
implied terms and to price-delivery terms), carriage of goods (including bills of 
lading and maritime insurance), and international payments and finance (bills 
of exchange and letters of credit).72 The transnational dimension of private law 
is arguably even more influential if one considers the complex global 
movements in ideas of law across national systems.73 
With the modern rise of nation-states, legislators and judges made efforts to 
simultaneously draw significant content from merchant practice into law while 
modifying that content to further state interests and concerns.74 Customary 
practice was almost always modified as it became common law through 
common-law courts or through legislation such as commercial codes. This 
“nationalization” process provided state procedures for participants seeking 
third-party enforcement through private-law adjudication, but it also introduced 
various state considerations, such as constraints on enforcement of private 
agreements that were illegal or contrary to public policy.75 This subtle and 
delicate balance between customary practice and state policies continues to 
characterize private law. 
B. The Transnational Private Law of Contract 
The complex role of private law in the mediation of private ordering, 
including in transnational context, is nowhere more evident than with respect to 
contract. Contract law is not typically framed as concerned with the relationship 
among plural orders. Instead, contract seems to be about the specific terms and 
conditions for enforcement of agreements between individuals involved in 
particular transactions. However, significant traditions of contract emphasize 
the social and institutional context for contract, such as work on relational 
 
 71. Id. at 495. 
 72. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 6, at 51–52. Cross-border economic 
innovations and practice has also pushed the limits of traditional private-law doctrine. For example, 
both bills of lading and letters of credit have influenced core common-law doctrines related to privity 
and consideration. See ANSON’S LAW OF CONTRACT 421–23 (J. Beatson ed., 27th ed. 1998). Similar 
influences on the common law of contract by transnational commercial relations are found with respect 
to force majeure and frustration of contract. G.H. TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE MAJEURE (2d 
ed. 1994). 
 73. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–1968, 36 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631 (2003) (describing globalizations in the structure of law and legal 
consciousness in the periods 1850–1914 and 1900–1968). 
 74. CUTLER, supra note 31, at 108–41. 
 75. Id. 
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contracts.76 For example, Hugh Collins interprets contractual regulations as 
concerned with framing the self-government of social relations between 
parties.77 Although social-contract theory may no longer suffice to capture the 
political foundations for society in general, contract clearly is used to set both 
substantive and procedural rules for governance of particular social relations 
and associations. Examples of procedural measures include inspection, 
monitoring, outside verification, complaint processes, mediation, and all the 
way through to arbitration and dispute settlement. Teubner builds from such 
governance features of contract to an autopoietic vision of contract as a “self-
reproducing system of communicative interaction between contractual 
partners.”78 
Contract performs a similar spectrum of governance functions in 
international business. Contracts have been the foundation for the arrangement 
of core international business transactions, whether they are international sales 
or the many kinds of arrangements that surround sales transactions, such as 
carriage, insurance, or payment. A typical international-business-transactions 
text will identify contract as a central device for managing the potentially 
complex multiplicity of kinds of laws and norms related to sales transactions.79 A 
broader governance role for contract is more clearly in view in more sustained 
forms of business transactions such as investment transactions, in which 
contracts like shareholders’ agreements, joint-venture agreements, franchise 
agreements, or distribution agreements are core sources of the legal obligations 
of relevant parties. 
The relation of both sales and investment contracts to plural orders is 
highlighted by general contractual clauses that incorporate into the relation an 
extensive set of background or default norms developed by a particular social 
order. Standard examples are references to the norms of various shipping 
associations with respect to maritime insurance,80 to the Incoterms for delivery 
terms in international sales of goods,81 and to the Uniform Customs and Practice 
for Documentary Credits (UCP).82 Forum-selection clauses and choice-of-law 
clauses are likewise examples of contractual provisions that have a clear 
 
 76. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN 
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980) (discussing modern contractual relations as significantly involving 
relational contracts). 
 77. HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (1999). 
 78. TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 117. 
 79. For example, such agreements are the foundations for most of the problem exercises for 
various forms of business problems in part two of DETLEV VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 
PROBLEMS (1998). 
 80. SCHMITHOFF’S EXPORT TRADE: THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 351–
52 (Leo D’Arcy et al. eds., 10th ed. 2000). 
 81. ICC, Incoterms, supra note 43. 
 82. ICC, UCP, supra note 43. Through contractual choice, parties can also choose provisions of 
international treaties, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, even when the treaty has not been implemented by the states 
relevant to the transaction. 
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governance role in specifying the venue for dispute settlement and the 
background state laws that will govern the international business relation. 
Finally, clauses selecting international commercial arbitration provide for 
dispute settlement in an international, but nonstate, venue. A sense of 
separation from state processes of governance increases as more and more of 
both background substantive law and dispute-resolution procedures are subject 
to private choice. 
An end point in this spectrum of contract as governance in international 
business relations is that a concept of self-validating contract finds Teubner’s 
analysis of global merchant law without a state.83 The self-validating contract as 
a vehicle for reflexive regulation in the domestic context becomes, in the cross-
border context, a fundamental challenge to the relevance of sovereign law. In 
particular, contract is seen as the central “legal” device that links together 
transnational systems of private actors—such as among transnational business 
actors or within multinational corporations—that straddle national borders and 
regulate themselves, not according to any national laws, but rather according to 
the autopoietic norms of the social system itself. Contract is the device not only 
for self-regulation, but also for the separation of a social relation from state-law 
processes. 
C. Foregrounding the Transnational Nature of Private Law: Bringing Private 
International Law Into Private Law 
A focus on private law makes clear the sense in which private law mediates 
the relationship of state law to nonstate normative orders, but viewing private 
law in isolation from private international law obscures continuities of concern 
in relating state private-law systems to foreign legal systems. Considering 
private law and private international law together permits a greater 
appreciation of the manner in which state private law has had a cosmopolitan 
concern in dealing with the existence of plural orders, including foreign states. 
Considering private law and private international law together also discloses 
structural similarities in approach to subjects that straddle both fields, such as 
treatment of arbitration clauses. Analytical habits developed in one area 
influence the other. Recently, significant analysis of contract has emphasized 
the degree to which private contractual relations are understood as governance 
relations.84 It may be that analysis based on the relationship between sovereigns 
has a larger and more pervasive influence on legal reasoning, including 
respecting “private” associations.85 Ehrlich, for example, observed that “in 
actual fact the entire private law is a law of associations.”86 
 
 83. Teubner, supra note 29. 
 84. See COLLINS, supra note 77. 
 85. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). For a striking 
example of the parallels operating at the level of legal consciousness, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE 
RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 40–43, 255–60 (1975, 2006). 
 86. EHRLICH, supra note 69, at 43. 
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Factoring in private international law, transnational private law has not only 
followed customary practice and allowed significant party autonomy respecting 
articulating customized nonstate norms or incorporating such norms, but 
private law appears to extend that openness to use by private parties of norms 
(and processes) drawn from foreign legal systems. Three standard examples of 
private-international-law questions highlight the normalcy of “foreign” norms 
in private law. 
First, even basic questions of jurisdiction highlight an unusually 
cosmopolitan concern with foreign interests and practices. For a domestic court 
to even ask this question, especially when guided only by common-law rules, is 
for that court to identify the possibility of its own limits. The issue of 
jurisdiction of course is more general, as in federal or municipal law.87 But in the 
context of private international law, jurisdictional issues involve a state 
institution responding not to any hierarchy of sovereign structures, but more to 
the existence of another, parallel-level foreign legal system with connections to 
a particular dispute.88 That a court might decline to hear a claim, for example, 
for reasons of forum non conveniens or comity, is clearly an effort to manage 
considerations of the existence of concurrent normative authorities. 
Second, respecting choice of law, the unexceptional situation in which a 
domestic court might assume jurisdiction but then apply the law of another 
system shows an acceptance of the concurrent authority of foreign law that 
defeats any parochial image of private law. That a local court might sometimes 
apply foreign law makes it also much less surprising that the institution might 
engage in the same application respecting developed sets of nonstate yet 
transnational norms, such as those developed by particular merchant groups. 
This sense of concurrent plural systems is reinforced by the possibility of mixing 
different applicable laws through practices of dépeçage, permitting the 
application of different laws to different parts of a complex transaction.89 
Third, there has been increasing recent emphasis on the role of contractual 
choice regarding questions of jurisdiction and choice of law. Forum-selection 
clauses and choice-of-law clauses are now typically enforced in contemporary 
private law.90 The enforcement of arbitration clauses selecting international 
 
 87. For an intriguing example, see the account of local favela law in SANTOS, supra note 9, at 134–
37. The local Residents Association engages in careful consideration of questions of jurisdiction in 
dealing with both dispute prevention and dispute settlement. Through jurisdictional decisions, the local 
association augments its authority, but also manages its relation to other legal authorities, here the 
Brazilian state. 
 88. Jurisdictional issues in private international law are commonly understood as concerned with 
the “vertical” relation of state to individual parties rather than the “horizontal” relation of state to 
other legal systems; for a discussion of this distinction, and an identification of it as related to 
differences in paradigm between the United States and Europe, see Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of 
Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1003 (2006). 
 89. See, e.g., Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations arts. 3(1), 4(1), 
June 19, 1980, 1605 U.N.T.S. 80, at 81–82 (Article 3(1) states, “[T]he parties can select the law 
applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract.”). In the specific context of international 
contract, see PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 122–38 (1999). 
 90. NYGH, supra note 89. 
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commercial arbitration rather than domestic civil litigation is a further 
development in this direction, showing how similar policy reasoning 
emphasizing the autonomy of parties and facilitating international commerce 
can sustain party choice of both nonstate and foreign state processes.91 
To an outside observer, these features of private international law are quite 
impressive examples of tolerance in the face of plural normative orders. The 
two basic questions of conflict of laws—jurisdiction and choice of law—and the 
willingness to distinguish the two, evidence a modesty of private law in the face 
of coexisting legal orders. This is different from a hierarchical order of 
constitutional requirements respecting federalism or the division of powers, 
even if some minimal requirements in the conflict of laws are sometimes found 
in constitutional requirements.92 It is different as well from public international 
law, in which restraints on jurisdiction and applicable law come from the 
customary or conventional practice in the sovereign-state system.93 In private 
law, there are far fewer hierarchical requirements to act with comity toward 
other legal systems. 
All of these practices reflect a sophisticated, critical disaggregation in 
transnational private law of simple conceptions of sovereignty. To separately 
consider matters of governing law and jurisdiction, to assign different applicable 
laws to different aspects of relations, to see a role for private-party choice in 
deciding these questions, are all responses to complexity that see the possibility 
of creative mixing. Within this context of private international law, it is less 
surprising that private law demonstrates suppleness in relation to nonstate 
normative orders. An overall picture of a transnational private-law regime 
emerges as concerned with the interrelationship among different normative 
orders. Transnational private law appears as a regime of surprising tolerance 
and of conditional cosmopolitan hospitality.94 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. This is true not only in the United States, but also increasingly in foreign jurisdictions. The 
dramatic constitutionalization of private international law in Canada has occurred relatively recently, 
through cases such as Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 (Can.), and Hunt v. T&N 
plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (Can.). For a discussion of these cases, see Robert Wai, In the Name of the 
International: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Internationalist Transformation of Canadian 
Private International Law, 39 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 117 (2001). 
 93. There are some relevant international treaties, most significantly the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38, but the bulk of private-international-law rules are not the subject of international treaty. 
In this respect, the challenges to the more ambitious effort at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law to draft an international convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement 
of foreign civil judgments is revealing, resulting in a treaty of more limited scope, the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005; see RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M. 
HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURTS AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY 
AND DOCUMENTS (2008). 
 94. Derrida, supra note 65, at 128. 
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V 
THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TRANSNATIONAL  
PRIVATE LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PLURAL ORDERING 
Transnational private law has always had the task of relating state policy 
and processes to other forms of social ordering. In its most successful forms, for 
example with respect to letters of credit, private law has anticipated and 
satisfied private-actor preferences and expectations while influencing and 
guiding private ordering, customary norms, and nonstate sources. Private 
ordering now includes state-law norms and processes as part of normal practice 
and expectations. This is partly because of the power and utility of state law (for 
example, in providing third-party enforcement and background norms), but also 
because state private law has been responsive to the varied desires of private-
party participants. 
In part III I argued that an important part of the space for state influence 
comes because the nature of even consensual transactions is not always, over 
time, one of clear cooperative benefit. Systems analyses based on shared 
functional objectives diminish the degree to which potential conflict remains 
pervasive, with third parties but even as between parties to consensual 
transactions. Conflicts do arise, especially ex post, and are not always resolvable 
in a voluntary fashion. The efficiency gains from third-party enforcement exist 
because of limits on Coasean bargaining and the challenge of transactions costs, 
especially given imperfections in information, incomplete insurance markets, 
and limits on strategic bargaining.95 This is consistent with the observation from 
critical legal studies and legal realism about the incomplete and always 
contestable structure of even the most elaborated system of norms of a state 
system. Teubner’s foundational self-validating contract, like a social contract 
between the parties for all time and across all space, is clearly limited by the 
constraints on perfect bargaining and exchange, something parties themselves 
face at the moment of their first conflict. The result is that private ordering both 
presents situations of conflict over contestable norms and may require a third 
party to resolve disputes. State courts and norms can and do play this role. 
Beyond such limits on the capacity for complete bargaining with perfect 
foresight, the insights of constructivist theory must be taken on board. Many 
kinds of interests and identities shift in the context of an ongoing relationship. 
The idea of what constitutes interest is malleable, especially if there is 
recognition of the plural identities and goals of the various participants in any 
particular social system. Ideas about private interest, like ideas about national 
interest, can shift through processes of normative engagement grounded in 
complex social processes. The result is that law can play an important 
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constitutive role, including at the level of personal, group, and even national 
identity.96 
This constant but dynamic role of the state in formation of normative 
expectations among private actors creates room for values other than strictly 
facilitative ones. This is clearest in those areas of international commercial 
practice in which state laws continue, even after this long period of time, to 
provide important substantive rules. For example, in the area of letters of 
credit, the well-established and elaborate set of customary norms of commercial 
practice in the UCP are mostly silent respecting the important fraud exception, 
and different state laws have developed variations on that.97 More generally, the 
UCP assumes a backdrop of contract laws in various jurisdictions that 
determine questions of validity of the underlying bargains between the relevant 
parties. 
The process of adjustment is constant and mutual. Even after absorbing 
many mercantile norms into its laws, the state process must remain open to the 
changing functional needs and normative expectations of business actors. To do 
otherwise would be to encourage flight from the state system (either permitted 
or illicit) and to discourage potentially productive private ordering. The 
constrained characteristic of governance through private law is evident from its 
distinct regulatory structure for enforcement. Private-law regulation is 
dependent on private decisions by nonstate actors to bring claims, but also to 
engage in private ordering in the shadow of the law. Because it is not 
“command and control regulation,” private law depends on indirectly 
influencing private ordering and claims through its structure of incentives, and 
thus must ensure that its content and procedures accord with the expectations 
and other priorities of private actors. This distinctive character of private-law 
regulation is a source of both weakness and strength. 
The delicate balance and process of mutual adjustment remains the central 
challenge for private law in the transnational context. State private law should 
retain a real presence in the transnational normative order by reinforcing the 
understanding of participants in the various social systems that the state system 
is both responsive to and constitutive of cross-border private ordering. 
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